Fabrizio Sciacca¹

7 de agosto de 2026

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Esta série Especial do Boletim Lua Nova apresenta reflexões produzidas por pesquisadoras e pesquisadores vinculados à rede internacional Justice in the XXI Century: A Perspective from Latin America (JUSTLA). O projeto, coordenado pela Universidade de Catania (Itália) e financiado pela União Europeia no âmbito da ação HORIZON-Marie Skłodowska-Curie Staff Exchanges, reúne 148 integrantes de 18 instituições da América Latina e da União Europeia.

Os escritos que seguem são um convite a atravessar diferentes territórios do conhecimento para (re)pensar a justiça no século XXI. Ao longo da série, o JUSTLA promove um diálogo entre pesquisas desenvolvidas em diferentes contextos e abordagens, de modo que o leitor e a leitora poderão acompanhar um movimento no qual ideias, contextos e práticas se entrelaçam para reinventar, no presente, o sentido da justiça.

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1.Equality²

I use ‘equality’ here in a normative and politico-institutional sense rather than a descriptive one. To say that individuals are equal is not to claim that they are similar in ability, income, health, preferences, or character, but rather that differences in treatment and position must be justifiable by publicly defensible criteria and consistent with the equal standing of persons (Dworkin, 1977; Bobbio, 1995). On this view, equality is displaced from the level of individual attributes to that of rules and institutions: what matters is the form of justification and the quality of the political relations among members of the community. This helps to avoid two recurrent confusions in debates on inequality. The first is to convert equality into an empirical thesis: if equality were the claim that human beings are in fact alike, it would be vulnerable to any evidence of difference. In reality, normative equality does not deny difference; it holds only that differences, when they become socially and institutionally consequential, must be justified (Scanlon, 2018). The second confusion is to identify equality with uniformity. A society may be egalitarian while still allowing significant differences; it becomes normatively inegalitarian when those differences generate unjustified disadvantages or durable relations of subordination (Anderson, 1999).

A more exact formulation of justification is this: differential treatment is compatible with equality if it can be defended by reasons that the persons affected could recognise as non-arbitrary within a context of public justification. Equality, thus understood, does not require everyone to possess the same things; it requires that what distinguishes them in terms of socially significant effects should not be the result of mere privilege, stigma, or exclusion (Rawls, 1971; Scanlon, 2018). In this sense, equality concerns the structure of the social and institutional order, not a psycho-biological property of persons.

A standard, but theoretically indispensable, distinction is that between formal equality and substantive equality. Formal equality concerns the generality of the norm and legal standing: individuals are equally recognised as persons and citizens, and the law applies to them as such (Bobbio, 1990). This level is historically significant, since it marks the break with orders of privilege and estate; yet it does not by itself ensure that equality will yield outcomes compatible with the democratic promise.

Substantive equality, by contrast, concerns the actual conditions for the exercise of rights and freedoms: access to basic goods, the real possibility of using one’s freedoms, and the reduction of structural obstacles that render formal entitlement merely nominal (Sen, 1992). The point is straightforward: if two individuals formally possess the same right, but only one has the means and conditions to exercise it, the difference is normatively relevant. This does not mean that every inequality of outcome must be corrected; it does mean, however, that egalitarian judgement cannot stop at legal form without attending to the social mechanisms that make the effective exercise of rights possible or impossible (Williams, 1962).

It is important to note that ‘substantive’ does not automatically mean ‘equal outcome’. Even a demanding egalitarian theory may allow differences of outcome, provided they do not arise from systemic barriers and remain compatible with a framework in which persons can recognise one another as equals (Rawls, 2001; Anderson, 1999). Substantive equality is therefore a criterion of effective access, not a levelling principle.

A second distinction in contemporary debate is that between distributive equality and relational equality. Distributive equality concerns the distribution of goods and opportunities: income, wealth, access to services, education, healthcare, housing, and so forth. In this sense, equality is often discussed in terms of allocation and compensation, and of which differences are justifiable (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1992).

Relational equality, by contrast, concerns the quality of social relations: whether members of society relate to one another as equals or whether some categories are structurally subordinated, humiliated, made dependent, or denied voice. This perspective does not deny the importance of distribution, but argues that inequality becomes especially serious when it generates a hierarchical order of status: some are systematically treated as less credible, less audible, or merely as objects of public policy. A distributive difference may therefore become normatively decisive not simply because of the magnitude of the gap, but because of the relations of power and recognition it establishes.

This distinction also helps explain why societies with similar levels of economic inequality may exhibit very different political climates. In one case, the gap may be seen as compatible with mobility, contestability, and dignity; in another, it may be experienced as a sign of exclusion and structural dependence. The difference cannot be reduced to the economic datum alone; it concerns the institutional and symbolic structure through which distribution is converted into status (Fraser, 2008; Scanlon, 2018).

An important corollary is that judgements of equality always require an explicit metric. To say that ‘this difference violates equality’ is incomplete unless one specifies equality with respect to what: basic freedoms, equal opportunity, effective capabilities, status, non-domination, or access to fundamental goods (Sen, 2009; Scanlon, 2018). Making the metric explicit does not eliminate conflict, but it renders disagreement intelligible and arguable.

Within this framework, a useful operational definition is the following: equality is violated when a difference in treatment or condition produces a normatively unjustified disadvantage with respect to a relevant metric and, in particular, when it stabilises relations of subordination or prevents individuals from participating as equals in social and political life (Anderson, 1999; Fraser, 2008). This definition does not claim to settle the debate over metrics of justice; it does, however, identify the most common methodological error, namely inferring injustice from the mere presence of difference.

2. Social inequalities

‘Social inequality’ does not designate a single phenomenon. It may refer to differences in income and wealth, but also to disparities in access to education and health, inequalities in bargaining power, asymmetries of political representation and influence, or hierarchies of prestige and social credibility (Scanlon, 2018). An analytical account therefore requires that one always specify which inequality is at issue, rather than treating the term as though it referred to a homogeneous object.

A preliminary distinction is that between difference and normatively relevant inequality. Not every difference between individuals or groups is a matter of justice. Difference becomes inequality in a critical sense when it produces a disadvantage with respect to a relevant normative metric, for example access to basic goods, effective capabilities, social status, or non-domination (Sen, 1992; Sen, 2009). Without this specification, assessment remains indeterminate.

Distributive inequalities are central because they shape living conditions, existential security, and opportunity. Income and wealth affect access to goods and services, the quality of education, health, life-planning, and the capacity to choose (Rawls, 1971). For this reason, any theory of inequality must include a distributive dimension.

Yet distributive description alone is not enough to determine the normative seriousness of an inequality. The same quantitative gap may have different meanings in different institutional contexts: welfare, public education, labour markets, fiscal regimes, and social protection all shape the way distribution translates into vulnerability and dependence (Walzer, 1983). Measuring gaps is therefore necessary, but not sufficient.

Many inequalities become philosophically and politically salient when they affect status. Status concerns social credibility, visibility, the capacity to be heard, and recognition as a fully legitimate interlocutor. From this perspective, inequality  is serious when it stabilises the devaluation of certain groups, reducing their public voice and their capacity to participate as equals.

This helps explain why some societies tolerate certain levels of economic disparity while others respond with intense conflict. It is not only the scale of inequality that matters, but the way it translates into hierarchies of dignity and voice. Inequality is often politically destabilising when it is experienced as inferiorisation, not merely as material distance.

Inequality becomes especially critical when it produces structural dependence. In such cases, the problem is not simply that some have less, but that some remain persistently exposed to the decisions of others without adequate resources for contestation or exit (Pettit, 1997). At this point, inequality begins to approach domination, that is, a relation in which the practical freedom of subjects is constrained by systemic vulnerability.

These forms may operate without direct coercion, through labour markets, housing precarity, debt, selective access to services, or administrative procedures. Inequality is therefore not only an economic problem, but an institutional one: it concerns who can impose conditions and who can contest them credibly (Anderson, 2017). Dependence, in this sense, is a structural indicator of the seriousness of inequality.

It is useful to distinguish at least four dimensions of inequality: distributive (goods and resources), relational (dependence and subordination), institutional (access, guarantees, contestability), and symbolic (stigma and credibility). These dimensions are conceptually distinct, but in concrete cases they often reinforce one another.

One consequence is that a single indicator cannot exhaust evaluation. A society may reduce some distributive inequalities while preserving strong status hierarchies, or may guarantee formal rights while still producing systemic dependence. Diagnosis therefore always requires connecting resources, institutions, and social relations.

Social inequalities directly affect democratic legitimacy when they undermine the capacity to participate in the formation and contestation of collective decisions. If some social positions systematically entail lower credibility, fewer channels of access, or less agenda-setting power, the promise of political equality is compromised (Anderson, 1999; Bobbio, 1995). In that case, inequality is no longer a mere social fact: it becomes an internal tension within democratic life.

In sum, social inequality is a multidimensional phenomenon. To assess it, one must specify the type of inequality, the normative metric adopted, and the effects on status, dependence, and contestability. Only then can one avoid both the automatic equation of difference with injustice and the technocratic neutralisation of social hierarchies (Sen, 2009; Scanlon, 2018).

3. Metrics of justice and assessment

Judgements about inequality depend on the normative metric adopted. The same empirical configuration may be assessed in opposite ways depending on whether one privileges aggregate utility, rights, resources, capabilities, or non-domination (Sen, 2009; Scanlon, 2018). Assessment therefore requires that the criterion be made explicit, not merely the facts described.

A metric may be appropriate for some problems and inadequate for others. For example, distributive indicators capture gaps in resources well, but may understate status and dependence; procedural metrics protect against overt coercion, but may overlook structural vulnerability (Anderson, 1999; Anderson, 2017). Clarifying the metric helps avoid implicit normative inferences.

Within liberal egalitarianism, inequalities are permissible if they are compatible with equal basic liberties and justifiable within fair institutions, especially in relation to the position of the least advantaged (Rawls, 1971; Rawls, 2001). The focus is the ‘basic structure’, that is, the way institutions organise cooperation and opportunity. The aim is not to eliminate differences, but to make them publicly justifiable.

Consequentialism and libertarianism assess inequality from markedly different perspectives. Consequentialism evaluates social arrangements according to their overall outcomes, such as welfare, reduced suffering, and efficiency (Mill, 1861). It rightly draws attention to consequences and real trade-offs, although aggregate measures may obscure the asymmetric costs borne by particular groups in terms of status and contestatory power (Anderson, 1999; Fraser, 2008). Libertarianism³, by contrast, focuses primarily on the legitimacy of acquisition and transfer: an inequality is not unjust if it results from voluntary exchanges and does not involve violations of rights (Nozick, 1974). This perspective makes clear that redistribution is not normatively neutral; however, its conception of voluntariness becomes less persuasive in contexts marked by material dependence and contractual asymmetry (Anderson, 2017).

The capability approach shifts the focus from the resources individuals possess to the freedoms they actually enjoy. Individuals with the same resources may differ in their actual capabilities to achieve valuable functionings and pursue meaningful opportunities (Sen, 1992; Sen, 1999). This makes visible contextual differences often overlooked by purely distributive metrics. The selection of relevant capabilities, however, and their public justification remain contested (Nussbaum, 2000).

The pluralism of spheres of justice holds that different goods follow different logics and that injustice often arises when one good, typically money, dominates across spheres (Walzer, 1983).Finally, relational approaches assess whether individuals can stand as equals, without subordination or humiliation, rather than simply how many resources they possess (Anderson, 1999; Fraser, 2008). This helps explain why some inequalities are corrosive even when they are not extreme in quantitative terms.

In sum, there is no single metric that exhausts the assessment of social inequalities. An adequate analytical method makes the adopted criterion explicit and recognises both what each metric captures and what it tends to overlook (Sen, 2009; Scanlon, 2018). This renders normative disagreement clearer and reduces argumentative ambiguity.

4. Perceptions of injustice, resentment, diagnosis

Inequalities also have a perceptual dimension: they are interpreted and experienced within public narratives, expectations of recognition, and social comparison. In democratic societies, the egalitarian horizon makes every asymmetry of status more salient, and this in turn affects the stability of legitimisation (Honneth, 1992; Fraser, 2008). This dimension is part of the social phenomenon itself.

Yet the perception of injustice is not, by itself, a conclusive criterion. It may indicate real subordination, but it may also reflect errors of attribution or political narratives that displace responsibility. Diagnosis must therefore connect lived experience to structures: which institutions, which dependencies, which barriers make such perceptions plausible?

Resentment is a particularly important case because it tends to emerge when individuals experience a loss of status or social irrelevance, often in contexts of economic insecurity and weak representation. In this sense, it can be an indicator of relational inequality: not merely ‘having less’, but ‘mattering less’ (Fraser, 2008). The difficulty is that resentment can be politically redirected towards more accessible symbolic targets rather than structural causes.

To make the issue analytically manageable, it is useful to treat perceptions of injustice as defeasible evidence: that is, as a consideration requiring confirmation or revision through institutional analysis. The question then becomes whether the perception corresponds to a stable form of subordination or to a deficit in the contestability of the conditions imposed. If it does, the inequality is plausibly normatively relevant; if it does not, the origin of the interpretation must be explained without treating it as proof.

This approach avoids two errors. The first is “psychologisation”, which reduces inequality to individual emotions and obscures social structures. The second is the reverse: ignoring the experiential and symbolic dimension and treating inequality as a purely quantitative datum. An adequate theory must therefore connect distribution, status, and institutions to the ways in which inequalities are perceived and rendered politically effective.

* Este texto não reflete necessariamente as opiniões do Boletim Lua Nova ou do CEDEC. Gosta do nosso trabalho? Apoie o Boletim Lua Nova!

References

Anderson, E. (1999). What is the point of equality? Ethics, 109(2), 287–337.
Anderson, E. (2017). Private government: How employers rule our lives (and why we don’t talk about it). Princeton University Press.
Bobbio, N. (1990). L’età dei diritti. Einaudi.
Bobbio, N. (1995). Eguaglianza e libertà. Einaudi.
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press.
Fraser, N. (2008). Scales of justice: Reimagining political space in a globalizing world. Columbia University Press.
Honneth, A. (1992). Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte. Suhrkamp.
Mill, J. S. (1998). Utilitarianism. Edited by Roger Crisp. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. Basic Books.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach. Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government. Oxford University Press.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as fairness: A restatement. Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (2018). Why does inequality matter? Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (1992). Inequality reexamined. Clarendon Press.
Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Knopf.
Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Allen Lane.
Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of justice: A defense of pluralism and equality. Basic Books.
Williams, B. (1962). The idea of equality. In P. Laslett & W. G. Runciman (Eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society (2nd series, pp. 110–131). Blackwell.

1. Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Catania, where he has held a chair since 2004. He received his PhD from the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa and is a member of the Centre for Law, Democracy and Society at Queen Mary University of London. Trained in law, Fabrizio has undertaken research at a number of universities abroad, particularly in Germany and the United Kingdom, and has led major international research projects. His research focuses principally on the theory of normativity and theories of justice. ↩︎
2. An Italian-language version of this work appeared in S. Gozzo (ed.), Intersections. The Forms of Inequality, Franco Angeli, Milan, 2026. ↩︎
3. Here, “libertarianism” refers to the contemporary political-philosophical tradition associated with strong individual rights, private property, voluntary exchange, and a limited state, exemplified by Nozick. This usage should be distinguished from the older historical meaning of “libertarian,” particularly in European political thought, where the term has also designated anarchist and libertarian socialist traditions. ↩︎